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Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance 
BY Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné and Maria Guadalupe * 
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP), a policy that increases shareholder 
"voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a 
regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. 
Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (5%) and to improvements in long-
term profitability. In contrast, it has limited effects on pay levels and structure. Taken 
together our results suggest that SoP can be seen as a repeated regular vote of confidence 
on the CEO and that it serves as a disciplining device. 
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1. Introduction 
How much "voice" should shareholders have in a modern corporation? When 
shareholders disagree with the course a corporation is taking, and exercising 
control is not possible or too costly, there are two main mechanisms by which to 
express their dissent: they can either sell their shares (exit), or engage with 
management and express their opinions, i.e. use their "voice" (Hirschman, 1970). 
This paper studies the effect on shareholder value, firm performance and CEO 
compensation of one channel through which shareholders can voice their views: 
Say-on-Pay (SoP). Say-on-Pay is in essence a vote on executive pay and its 
relationship to firm performance. Since they are not merely voting on the level of 
pay but whether that level reflects the value that the CEO adds to the firm, it can 
be seen as an explicit vote of confidence which aggregates the opinions of all 
shareholders (not just the most active) into a simple, highly visible metric.  
Before the introduction of Say-on-Pay, shareholders could vote on general 
governance provisions and compensation-related proposals.1 To date, along with 
the direct election of board members, Say-on-Pay is the only mandatory 
mechanism imposed on U.S. firms to allow shareholders to directly and publicly 
vote on how the firm is run. 2 
Our goal is to provide a causal estimate of the effects of the adoption of Say-
on-Pay on stock market returns and shareholder value, as well as its longer-term 
effects on accounting performance, firm policies, productivity and CEO 
compensation. To do this we use a regression discontinuity design on the vote 
outcomes of shareholder-sponsored Say-on-Pay proposals at annual meetings 
between 2006 and 2010. Previous investigations have been based on the cross-
 
1 Some of the other important and related voice mechanisms that have received attention include the role of activist funds 
in negotiations with management (e.g. Gantchev, 2013), or more general governance proposals (e.g. Gillan and Starks, 
2000, 2007; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). 
2 Ferracone and Harris (2011) and Cotter, Palmiter and Thomas (2013) provide evidence that in the post Dodd Frank 
period, failed Say-on-Pay votes followed poor firm performance relative to CEO pay. 
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sectional impact of the announcement or implementation of regulatory changes, 
and have yielded mixed results on the effect of Say-on-Pay: Cai and Walkling 
(2011) find no overall effect of Say-on-Pay and negative value effects for labor 
union sponsored proposals, Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2011) do not find a 
consistent pattern; Ferri and Maber (2010) and Vitanova and Iliev (2104) find 
generally a positive effect.  
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we provide an identification 
strategy that is particularly well suited to isolate a causal effect of Say-on-Pay on 
stock returns. Second, we study the changes in performance, firm policies and 
CEO compensation resulting from the Say-on-Pay vote, which provides evidence 
on the channels through which Say-on-Pay operates. 
Proponents of Say-on-Pay argue that it strengthens shareholder oversight and 
limits executive compensation excesses. Its critics counter that it undermines the 
power of the board and can be very costly to the firm, a view seemingly borne out 
by the fact that management is systematically opposed to this policy. Indeed when 
we looked at the proxy materials mailed to shareholders of the firms in our 
sample, in over 99 percent of cases management recommended a ‘vote against’ 
the shareholder-sponsored Say-on-Pay proposal.3  
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
made Say-on-Pay compulsory at all U.S. firms with effect from 2011. A policy 
that continues to be a source of contention. However, the debate on the merits of 
Say-on-Pay has been hampered by a lack of causal evidence on its consequences, 
in particular the performance effects of Say-on-Pay beyond the short-term market 
reaction. The adoption of Say-on-Pay is correlated with multiple firm attributes 
that also affect performance and hence is highly endogenous. Moreover, since 
 
3 This highlights the strong resistance to these proposals by management. This opposition, which is common to most 
shareholder-sponsored proposals, contributes to the high costs of a garnering enough votes to pass proposals (as 
highlighted by Gantchev, 2013), even when passing them is associated with positive market reactions. 
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investors incorporate expectations as they receive information on the value of 
adopting a Say-on-Pay proposal, it is difficult to capture its effect on market 
prices in the absence of individual unexpected events where new information is 
released.  
To address these concerns we use votes on proposals to adopt a Say-on-Pay 
policy at annual meetings as a quasi-experimental setting. Our sample includes 
250 cases of proposals to adopt the Say-on-Pay policy filed with the SEC by 
shareholders of S&P 1500 firms between 2006 and 2010. Specifically, we study 
votes to adopt the policy in the period in which Say-on-Pay was voluntary. Hence 
if the policy was adopted, shareholders voted on the relationship between CEO 
pay and performance in a subsequent meeting. We use a regression discontinuity 
design that compares the stock market reaction (as well as other outcomes) to 
Say-on-Pay proposals that pass by a small margin with those that fail by a small 
margin. The intuition being that the characteristics of firms where a Say-on-Pay 
proposal passes with 50.1% of the vote will be similar to those where it gets 
49.9% and fails to pass – yet this small difference will have a major impact on the 
probability of the proposals being implemented. In other words, where the vote is 
a ‘close call’, passing is akin to an independent random event that is correlated 
with the implementation of the proposal but is ‘locally’ exogenous (uncorrelated 
with other firm characteristics).  
When we compare firms with votes around the majority threshold, we find that 
the passing of Say-on-Pay is uncorrelated with the observed firm and meeting 
characteristics. Moreover, when studying the stock market reaction, it is precisely 
in such close-call situations that the vote contains substantial information—
switching from an unpredictable outcome to either pass or fail—that is not already 
fully incorporated in the stock price. Thus the regression discontinuity design 
delivers a causal estimate of the expected value of adopting Say-on-Pay.  
Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe (2012) likewise use a regression discontinuity 
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design to study a set of related governance issues, finding significant positive 
results of passing proposals that reduce anti-takeover protection but no results on 
the rest of shareholder proposals. Here we focus on a specific type of proposal – 
Say-on-Pay – which is inherently interesting given its controversial nature and its 
rapid incorporation into corporate governance in response to mandatory 
regulation. Over our sample period there are sufficient proposals to allow for the 
study of Say-on-Pay using a regression discontinuity design without having to 
pool different types of proposal for the analysis. Furthermore, since the sample of 
firms and the time period here are different from those in Cuñat, Gine and 
Guadalupe (2012), the two papers offer complementary interpretations of the 
effects of different governance structures.  
We find that Say-on-Pay significantly increases shareholder value. On the day 
of the vote, a Say-on-Pay proposal that passes yields an abnormal stock market 
return of 1.8% to 2.7% relative to one that fails. Since the outcome of the vote is 
not binding, the market reaction should only account for the increase in the 
probability that the proposal will be implemented after a positive shareholder 
vote. When we investigate whether the proposals were implemented, we observe 
a 40% to 50% higher probability of implementation for proposals that narrowly 
passed the threshold, implying that Say-on-Pay delivers an average increase in 
shareholder value of about 5% (3.4% to 6.75% depending on the estimates). This 
is of the same order of magnitude as removing two anti-takeover provisions (as 
estimated in Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). We show that this effect is driven 
by Say-on-Pay per se, not by other proposals voted on the same day. In addition 
we also show that the effect of Say-on-Pay proposals is different from other 
compensation-related proposals which, in contrast to the large positive response 
to Say-on-Pay, prompt no significant market response. This heterogeneity in the 
responses across compensation-related issues suggests it is not simply having a 
positive vote on the generic issue of compensation that matters, but a positive vote 
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on a specific proposal, in this case, Say-on-Pay. 
Where do these large market gains come from? In principle, there are two 
distinct channels through which a Say-on-Pay policy can improve firm 
performance. First, by giving shareholders a mechanism through which to express 
their opinions it intensifies board monitoring and pressure on the CEO to improve 
performance, given that a negative Say-on-Pay vote could have significant 
consequences on the support for the CEO within the firm. These consequences 
provide implicit incentives through a broad “career concerns” motive (Fama, 
1980) that may involve several channels such as turnover, long term earnings or 
reputation. Second, Say-on-Pay can potentially affect the current level and 
structure of executive pay such that it is more closely tied to performance. 
Our results suggest that Say-on-Pay has a positive impact on firms’ accounting 
and operational performance in the years following the vote (beyond the short-
term market reaction). Firms that vote to adopt Say-on-Pay have higher return on 
assets and operating assets one year after the vote. They also show a reduction in 
overheads and capital expenditure growth, one year after the vote. 
As for the effect of Say-on-Pay on compensation, we find no systematic 
change in the level or structure of CEO compensation, or the probability of the 
CEO leaving the firm after a positive Say-on-Pay vote. While there are significant 
changes in the composition of pay, these are not consistent across measures or 
over time, although the lack of an average effect on the level or structure of 
compensation may mask the possibility that different firms adjust compensation 
along different (and maybe opposing) dimensions. In short, we find no evidence 
that Say-on-Pay leads to statistically significant changes or across-the-board 
reductions in executive compensation.  
Our results suggest that Say-on-Pay serves to monitor and incentivize CEOs to 
deliver better firm performance by providing a clear mechanism for shareholders 
to voice their opinions, as confirmed by major improvements in shareholder value 
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and firm performance among the firms in our sample. This improvement in 
performance cannot be ascribed to a particular change in compensation or firm 
policies common to all firms, implying that “one size does not fit all” and that 
optimal responses may vary from one firm to another.  
Given the evidence that Say-on-Pay significantly benefits shareholders, why 
don’t all firms embrace it? Within our sample, management is systematically 
opposed to Say-on-Pay, yet our results suggest that where the proposal narrowly 
failed shareholders would have benefited from it passing, yet it did not muster 
sufficient support, implying a possible misalignment of objectives between 
management, boards and shareholders. Earlier research has documented reasons 
for such misalignment, for example some shareholders may have other stakes in 
the firm that make them vote in ways that do not maximize shareholder value.4 
Moreover, strategic voting can lead to contested votes even when a large majority 
of shareholders hold similar opinions.5 Such ‘deviations’ from shareholder value 
maximization show that relevant proposals with well-defined value implications 
can still be contested. They also underscore how hard it is for minority 
shareholders to bring about change. Another possibility is that views about the 
value of Say-on-Pay are heterogeneous; those represented by the aggregate vote 
in firms differ from those of the marginal investor setting stock prices. 
Since our identification strategy is based on a regression discontinuity that by 
design yields a local estimate, we must necessarily be cautious when extrapolating 
such effects to a broader population. In particular, given the high transaction costs 
of having a reasonable chance of winning a shareholder vote, some of the higher 
returns may be confined to firms in our sample which proposed to adopt Say-on-
 
4 For example, banks and insurance companies tend to side with management by voting against the proposals, while 
mutual funds, unions, advisors, and pension funds tend to support the proposals (Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), 
Agrawal, (2008). Mutual funds also determine their vote according to whether they have other lucrative business 
relationships with the firms that they invest in Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, Zachariadis (2014). 
5 The strategic voting theory was introduced by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). 
Maug and Rydqvist, (2009) show empirical evidence of strategic voting in corporate voting. 
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Pay – and hence the returns to implementing the proposal were largest. The fact 
that we find relatively large point estimates for the effect of Say on Pay may be an 
indication that the effects are largest in this sample. To assess the external validity 
of our estimates, we first compare the observable characteristics of firms around 
the discontinuity to firms voting a Say-on-Pay proposal with vote outcomes 
outside the discontinuity. We find there are no differences in observable 
characteristics between firms around and outside the discontinuity. We also note 
that 67% (35%) of all observations have votes that fall within 10 (5) percentage 
points of the majority threshold. This suggests that it may be possible to 
extrapolate the results to the set of firms outside the discontinuity – with caution. 
(See Appendix Table A1) Second, we compare our firms to the set of firms in the 
S&P 1500 that were not targets of Say-on-Pay proposals. Similar to the findings 
of Cai and Walkling (2011), the main difference between our firms and the rest of 
the S&P1500 sample is size (the difference in operating ratios or other variables is 
significantly reduced or disappears once size is controlled for). This fact needs to 
be taken into account when extrapolating our results to a broader set of firms.  
Our findings contribute to the debate about the appropriate role of government 
regulation and shareholder activism in shaping corporate governance structures. 
Say-on-Pay is compulsory in many countries (e.g. U.S., Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, U.K.). However, the controversy around Say-on-Pay continues.6 
Since this paper provides evidence that Say-on-Pay can have substantial positive 
effects on firm value and performance, it should help to guide the debate. 
 
6 While the Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Act made Say-on-Pay compulsory as of 2011, the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 eliminated the requirement for firms with gross annual revenues of less than $1 billion. 
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2. Background 
2.1. Say-on-Pay Policies 
Say-on-Pay policies are the result of a general trend in favor of greater 
executive accountability, transparency and shareholder rights, which has emerged 
following an increase in the number of shareholder proposals on compensation-
related matters submitted to a vote at annual meetings (see Ertimur, Ferri and 
Muslu, 2011 for an analysis of shareholder activism and pay). 
Our data consist of 250 shareholder proposals filed with the SEC between 
2006 and 2010 to give shareholders an advisory vote on executive pay (see Table 
1). Firms that adopt Say-on-Pay commit to giving shareholders a frequent regular 
vote on whether executive pay is commensurate with firm performance. 
Companies such as Motorola, Target, Raytheon and Pfizer were all ‘targets’ of 
Say-on-Pay proposals in that period.7 The increasing focus on Say-on-Pay in the 
U.S. culminated with its incorporation in the Dodd-Frank Act (July 2010) that 
regulates the governance and disclosure practices of public companies. Among 
other provisions, it gave shareholders the right to a regular advisory vote on 
current and future executive compensation. As of 2011 it has been mandatory for 
all U.S. listed firms.8  
Proponents of the bill claim that Say-on-Pay strengthens the relationship 
between the board, executives and shareholders, ensuring that board members 
fulfill their fiduciary duty. Critics insist that Say-on-Pay does not effectively 
 
7 A noteworthy case was the Verizon Say-on-Pay proposal in 2007, which was approved by a narrow majority of 50.18%. 
The board decided to implement it starting in 2009. Shareholders gave the following rationale for proposing to adopt Say-
on-Pay at Verizon: "We believe that the current rules governing senior executive compensation do not give shareholders 
sufficient influence over pay practices — nor do they give the Board adequate feedback from the owners of the company." 
This suggests increased voice, in the form of increased "feedback" and "influence" was an important goal of the proposal. 
The proposal also stated that Say-on-Pay would "...encourage shareholders to scrutinize the new, more extensive 
disclosures required by the SEC," suggesting that the incentive for shareholders to monitor increases when they have better 
tools to take action (a recurrent argument in Hirschman, 1970). 
8 The Dodd-Frank Act required an additional vote regarding the frequency of the compensation approval vote: to occur 
every 1, 2, or 3 years. 
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monitor compensation and is an intrusive measure that undermines the board’s 
authority. 
On average, shareholders voted 43% in favor of adopting Say-on-Pay 
proposals (Table 1). This is larger than the average vote on corporate governance 
shareholder proposals (36%) and relative to all other compensation proposals 
(23%).  
2.2. Expected effects of Say-on-Pay 
Given that Say-on-Pay votes are non-binding, it could be argued that it should 
have no effect on executive or director behavior, and hence firm outcomes. 
However, given the potential costs associated with it (e.g. legal costs, cost of 
managing the relationship with investors), the net effect of putting Say-on-Pay in 
place may well be negative even if it has no effect on behavior. It may also be 
detrimental in other respects. For example, since the board of directors is more 
informed about the company than the average shareholder, it should be better 
placed to make decisions. Likewise, directors and CEOs may have access to 
information that is best withheld from the market; hence restricting their freedom 
to decide may be value-destroying for shareholders. 
There are a number of channels through which Say-on-Pay may positively 
affect firm performance. A popular view is that Say-on-Pay curbs excessive 
executive pay, although the potential gains from the point of view of shareholder 
value are modest relative to total firm value. A slightly different mechanism 
operates via a better alignment of pay with performance: any improved incentives 
resulting from Say-on-Pay should make CEOs more effective at generating higher 
profits. Finally, Say-on-Pay allows shareholders to express dissent. Where 
adopted, it becomes an established part of the votes that shareholders cast at 
annual meetings that is likely to be as prominent as the election of new directors. 
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Since it is the only regular vote on the link between pay and performance, it is 
akin to a referendum or vote of confidence in the CEO – empowering 
shareholders by providing a mechanism through which they can disapprove of a 
CEO for poor performance.9 Even though the outcome of the vote is purely 
‘advisory’ (rather than binding), it aggregates shareholder opinion into a simple, 
visible metric and can be a means to coordinate action to remove management or 
board members. It gives shareholders a "voice" (Hirschman, 1970) with which 
they may discipline managers, making their monitoring (and the incentive to 
monitor) more effective. 
2.3. Related Literature 
The existing empirical evidence on Say-on-Pay mainly exploits announced or 
effective legal changes – which are arguably exogenous to the firm – combined 
with different ex-ante classifications of which firms should be more or less 
affected by the legislation. Cai and Walkling (2011), using an event study 
methodology, find that the Say-on-Pay bill passed in the House of Representatives 
in April 2010 created value for firms with inefficient executive compensation and 
with weak governance. Larcker, Ormazabal and Taylor (2011) examine a broader 
set of legislative events on several aspects of pay (including Say-on-Pay) and 
found no consistent pattern in market reactions to such events. Ferri and Maber 
(2013) examine the implementation of Say-on-Pay regulation in 2002 in the 
 
9 The evidence on the actual Say-on-Pay votes, once the policy is implemented is still small although the existing studies 
show some evidence that is consistent with the use of Say-on-Pay as some form of vote of confidence. Iliev and Vitanova 
(2014) show increased directorship support among firms that implement Say-on-Pay. They also present anecdotal evidence 
of the disciplining effects of losing or closely wining a Say-on-Pay vote. Cotter, Palmiter and Thomas (2013) explore the 
determinants of Say-on-Pay vote outcomes. They find that firm performance is the main determinant of Say-on-Pay votes, 
while the effects of CEO pay are in general small or non-existent. Ferracone and Harris (2011) also show that performance 
is focal to the Say on Pay votes and identify that 92% of the votes against management Say on Pay are due to a pay to 
performance disconnect.  
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United Kingdom and find a positive market reaction to the regulation in firms 
with weak penalties for poor performance. They also find some evidence that 
legislation increased the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor accounting performance 
(but not to stock performance), that is, it curbed “pay for failure” problems. To 
date, however, there is no evidence on the impact of Say-on-Pay on the detailed 
components of pay in the U.S. or on long-term firm performance in any of these 
countries. 
Relative to the regulatory event-study based evidence, our approach has the 
advantage of allocating firms to treatment and control groups using small 
differences in votes, which randomly assign them around the majority threshold. 
This generates treatment and control groups that are comparable in observable 
and unobservable characteristics. Conversely, regulatory event studies require the 
researcher to choose these groups ex-ante and assume common trends and the 
absence of spillovers. A second advantage is that we study the pre-mandatory 
period (2006-2010) and focus explicitly on Say-on-Pay votes at the firm level, 
generating events that are idiosyncratic and at different points in time. Hence our 
results are unlikely to be confounded by various items, news or information being 
released to the market on the same date as the legislative event. Legislative events 
also generate aggregate changes in the overall market for CEOs and spillovers on 
non-treated firms. This is particularly relevant in this setting, in which legislative 
changes are often bundled, or may contain information about future policy 
changes. As discussed below, our estimation strategy (the regression discontinuity 
design) deals with this problem and actually estimates a causal effect. 
Cai and Walkling (2011) also analyze firm-level proposals of shareholder Say-
on-Pay between 2006 and 2008. In contrast to the findings in this paper, they find 
generally insignificant effects, and actually negative effects for proposals by labor 
unions. These are associated with negative abnormal returns when announced, 
and positive when defeated. A relevant methodological difference between our 
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paper and Cai and Walkling (2011) is that they compare all the proposal 
announcements and outcomes (pass/fail), which could be correlated with omitted 
firm characteristics (such as the strength of unions within the firm). Instead, we 
focus on proposals around the voting majority threshold to use a form of 
exogenous variation.  
3. Data and identification strategy 
3.1. Data description 
We obtained data on Say-on-Pay proposals from Riskmetrics. The dataset 
includes information on all the proposals voted on in the S&P1500 universe and 
an additional 500 widely held firms. Our sample consists of 250 shareholder-
sponsored proposals voted on at annual meetings from 2006 until the 21st of July 
of 2010 to implement Say-on-Pay provisions.10 Riskmetrics provides information 
on the company name, the date of the annual meeting and the percentage of votes 
in favor of the proposal11.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of proposals by year and some vote 
statistics. The number of voted proposals increased throughout the period as well 
as the proportion of votes in favor. As a result, the percentage of proposals passed 
increased from 12% in 2007 to 26% in 2010. Our identification strategy relies on 
proposals with a close-call outcome. 67% (35%) of the proposals in our sample 
fall within ten (five) percentage points to each side of the majority threshold. 
We used additional information from a number of sources: security prices from 
 
10 The end date of the sample is chosen to match the date in which the final bill that makes Say-on-Pay compulsory was 
signed. The last observation in the sample corresponds to the 11th of June of 2010. A total of 254 proposals were filed with 
the SEC in the sample period. To avoid the risk that our results are driven by a few proposals, throughout the paper, we 
drop observations with extreme abnormal returns (firms above the top and below the bottom 1%) on the day of the vote. 
We also drop those firms with missing abnormal returns on the day of the vote. This leaves us with a sample of 250 
observations. The overall results in the paper are qualitatively similar if we use all observations. 
11 Two observations were reported to have exactly 50% of the votes in favor, so we checked whether they were considered 
to have passed and they did not. We therefore code them as “fail” with 49.9% of the vote. 
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CRSP were used to calculate daily abnormal returns with a standard unrestricted 
OLS market model and also with the three Fama-French factors plus a momentum 
factor as in Carhart (1997).12 Financial information came from Compustat and 
executive compensation from Execucomp. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics 
of our sample and defines all the variables used in the paper. 
 
3.2. Identification strategy 
 
 We are interested in the impact of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on an 
outcome variable for firm f at time t, yft (this can be the stock market reaction or 
subsequent performance and pay policies). We define vft as the votes in favor of a 
Say-on-Pay proposal, v* as the majority threshold for a proposal to pass and an 
indicator for pass as Dft = 1(vft ≥ v*), and write: 
 yf t = Κ + Dftθ + uft   (1) 
 The effect of interest is captured by the coefficient θ, while the error term 
uft represents all other determinants of the outcome. However, this regression is 
unlikely to give a consistent estimate , for instance because passing a proposal 
is correlated with omitted variables that are themselves correlated with yft, or in 
the presence of reverse causality, such that E(Dft, uft) ≠ 0 . 
 To obtain a causal estimate of the effect of Say-on-Pay proposals we use a 
regression discontinuity estimate, which exploits the fact that in an arbitrarily 
small interval around the discontinuity (the threshold v*) whether the proposal 
passed or failed is akin to a random outcome. Lee (2008) shows that as long as 
there is a (possibly small) random component to the vote, the assignment to 
“treatment” (pass and Dft = 1) and “control” groups (fails and Dft = 0) is random 
around the threshold. A simple nonparametric way to estimate  is therefore to 
 
12 The estimation period is 200 days, ending two months prior to the event date.  
ˆ
ˆ
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measure the difference in average yft between Say-on-Pay proposals that either 
pass or do not by a narrow margin of votes. This is an unbiased estimate of θ that 
can be interpreted as causal.  
However, a more efficient way to estimate the effect consists of fitting a 
flexible function that captures the continuous relationship between yft and v, 
allowing for a discontinuous jump at the discontinuity v*. To do this one needs to 
control for the relationship between the dependent variable and the vote share in a 
flexible way, through some function F(vf t, γ) . Adding year dummies ατ gives us: 
yf t  = Dft θ + F(vft, γ)  + ατ + uft  (2) 
In what follows, we present two different strategies for this. First, following 
Lee and Lemieux (2010), we approximate the underlying relationship between yft 
and vft, with two different polynomials for observations on the right-hand side of 
the threshold Pr(vft, γr) and on the left-hand side Pl(vft, γl) of the threshold, such 
that F(vf t, γ) =  Pr(vft, γr)+ Pl(vft, γl). The polynomials capture any continuous 
relationship between yft and vft, in particular, the effect of any confounding factors 
that are correlated both with the vote and firm characteristics in a continuous 
way.13 At the same time, θ captures the discrete changes in yft at the majority 
threshold, and is a consistent estimate of the causal effect of the passing of a 
proposal on yft.14 This procedure is a more efficient way to estimate the effect than 
a simple comparison of means around the threshold as all the observations 
participate in the estimation. The estimate of θ captures the weighted average 
 
13 We are considering other events at the annual meeting as part of the regression noise. This is correct as long as other 
unexpected events are not correlated with a close-call pass or fail. We confirmed that a close-call pass on Say-on-Pay does 
not predict whether a close-call vote on other proposals in the same meeting will pass or fail. An alternative approach is to 
estimate a discontinuity model for all the proposals in a meeting simultaneously, as in Cuñat, Giné, Guadalupe (2012). The 
results for this method yield very similar results as can be seen in Table A3.  
14 Say-on-Pay proposals are not binding. However, they have well-defined majority rules, which we use to calculate our 
vote margins. Given this, we are in a “fuzzy discontinuity design” setting and are estimating an Intent-to-Treat effect. To 
obtain the Treatment on the Treated, we could instrument whether the proposal is implemented with the vote outcome. 
However, as we show in Section 4.2, while discontinuous at the threshold, the vote does not predict implementation with 
strong enough significance to have a good first stage. Hence the paper shows Intent to Treat effects (ITT), although we 
provide an estimate of the treatment on the treated for the market value response by rescaling the ITT effect over the 
change in the probability of implementation at the discontinuity.  
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effect across all firms, where more weight is given to those firms in which a close 
election was expected. We report a polynomial of order three to each side of the 
discontinuity. We also checked that overall the results are robust to using 
polynomials of order four and five. 
Second, we use the non-parametric approach proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo 
and Titiunik (2014) (CCT). This approach approximates the regression function 
on either side of the majority threshold by a second order weighted polynomial 
regression. The weights are computed by applying a kernel function on the 
distance of each observation’s score to the cutoff. θ is then estimated as the 
difference between these non-parametric regression functions on either side of the 
majority threshold. Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) improve on earlier 
non-parametric estimators by calculating the optimal bandwidth that overcomes 
limitations of earlier non-parametric RD estimators (which tend to lead to 
bandwidths that are too large). As we will see, the results are fairly similar for the 
two estimators. 
Note that the combination of a regression discontinuity design with an event 
study setting has some additional desirable properties that are absent from 
traditional event studies. First, to the extent that the market can predict the vote, 
votes that win or lose by large margins will already be incorporated into prices 
prior to the vote, and thus we expect no significant price reaction far from the 
discontinuity. The closer the actual vote is to the discontinuity, the higher the ex-
ante uncertainty that is resolved by the outcome of the vote (whether the proposal 
effectively passes or fails). Hence we expect the largest market response around 
the discontinuity. In fact, how fast the abnormal return becomes zero as a function 
of the distance to the threshold is an indication of the precision with which the 
market was able to predict the vote.15 Second, the prior expectations of the market 
 
15 See Figure A4 for a more detailed explanation and Figures 3 and 4 for an empirical confirmation of these properties. 
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about the implementation of the proposal are identical on both sides of the 
discontinuity, as two firms that pass or reject the proposal by a small margin, will 
on average have the same prior expectation of passing it. The combination of an 
event study with a regression discontinuity design naturally takes care of any 
anticipated events prior to the vote. Appendix Figure A4 shows the predicted 
change in abnormal returns as a function of the vote share: it is highest (lowest) 
just to the right (left) of the threshold, and is closer to zero the further away the 
vote share is from the threshold.16 
 
3.3 Sample characteristics, external validity and pre-existing differences 
 
In this section we investigate two selection issues that are important to 
understand the external and internal validity of our results. The first is to assess 
whether the firms identifying our effect are representative of a broader population 
of firms. The second relates to the selection of firms within our sample into 
treated and non-treated firms. To the extent that the exact vote outcome around 
the threshold is random, our identification strategy implies there is no selection 
into treatment around the discontinuity, that is, firms that pass a Say-on-Pay 
provision by a few votes should ex-ante be comparable to firms that reject a Say-
on-Pay provision by a small margin. We run a number of tests to evaluate the 
validity of this assumption.  
First, since the Riskmetrics sample only includes the subset of firms targeted 
by votes on Say-on-Pay, we compare those to the population they are sampled 
from (S&P 1500 firms). Appendix Table A1 presents detailed summary statistics 
of firm characteristics for firms in our sample as well as for the universe of 
 
16 Cuñat, Giné, and Guadalupe (2012) give a more detailed account of these properties and show that the regression 
discontinuity estimate captures the expected value of the proposal (given implementation probabilities) after a positive 
vote. More generally, they show the conditions under which the value of implementing a proposal can be recovered in an 
event-study setting from the regression discontinuity estimate. 
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S&P1500 firms, both in 2005. A systematic difference between them appears to 
be firm size. Larger firms are significantly more likely to hold a Say-on-Pay vote: 
they have higher total market value, more employees, higher total CEO pay and 
less dispersed ownership17 – all characteristics of large firms. As is common 
among larger firms, they also have higher leverage, and, accordingly, higher 
return on equity. However, once one looks at other profitability ratios that control 
for size and leverage, the differences become smaller or disappear (as is also 
shown in Cai and Walkling, 2011). Similarly, total annual CEO pay is larger in 
our sample relative to the whole of S&P1500 in Execucomp (an average of $15m 
and $5m respectively). However, if we compute the residual of total CEO pay 
after controlling for firm size (assets) and stock returns, the difference in pay falls 
below $400k and it is not statistically significant.18  These sample characteristics, 
do not affect which firms are treated within our sample, and hence do not bias our 
estimate of the treatment effect. However, the fact that the sample tends to include 
the larger and more prominent firms of the S&P1500 should be taken into account 
when generalizing the results to a broader population of firms.19 
Second, in Appendix Table A1 we also compare the characteristics of firms 
around the discontinuity (within ten percentage points of the majority threshold) 
to the whole sample. We find that the subsample around the discontinuity is very 
similar to the whole population. All the variable means are statistically the same 
except for a small significant difference in top-5 ownership concentration (22% 
 
17 In the bottom panel of Table A1 one can see the typical structure of votes in our sample. Institutional investors have on 
average 72% of the votes, although these are quite dispersed among them. There are on average two shareholders with 
holdings above 5% and the top five investors accumulate on average 24% of the votes. In none of our observations do the 
top 5 shareholders accumulate enough votes to constitute a majority of votes. On average, a substantial number of votes are 
held by dispersed shareholders, which reduces the ex-ante predictability of the vote. Note that we restrict the comparison to 
2005 to avoid that the year stratification or the effects of the adoption of Say-on-Pay itself could drive the results. 
18 We compute abnormal pay as a residual of a regression of total pay on second order polynomials on assets and market 
returns that are allowed to vary by industry (variable labeled “abnormal pay” in Table A1). 
19 Iliev and Vitanova (2014) find results consistent with ours among smaller firms. They use an event study methodology 
paired with cross sectional regulatory differences to examine the effect of Say-on-Pay on firms of sizes with share float 
between $40 million and $110 million. This additional evidence on quite small companies complements ours and 
contributes to establishing the external validity of the effects found here. 
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vs. 24%). Overall, there is no evidence of selection into the discontinuity. 
Third, in Appendix Table A2 we investigate whether there are any systematic 
pre-existing differences between firms that pass Say-on-Pay and those that do not. 
We find some differences when we compare all firms that pass Say-on-Pay to all 
those that do not, indicating that the decision to adopt Say-on-Pay is endogenous 
to firm characteristics. However, these differences mostly disappear around the 
discontinuity, i.e. when we estimate our main specification using firm 
characteristics prior to the vote as the dependent variable (a detailed discussion of 
the table can be found in the Appendix). This absence of observable differences 
around the discontinuity lends support to our identification strategy. 
Finally, we analyze the distribution of shareholder votes. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of votes within the sample. First, the average and median vote is 
slightly below the majority threshold, but 64% of the observations fall within 10 
percentage points of the majority threshold. This implies that our regression 
discontinuity coefficient is estimated from a large and significant share of the 
actual votes and hence can be thought of as representative of the effect of Say-on-
Pay on the average firm in our sample. Second, Figures 1 and 2 show that the 
distribution of votes is continuous at the 50% threshold, suggesting that there is 
no strategic voting or withdrawal of proposals for close-call votes. 20  
Overall, this section shows that the assumptions behind our identification 
strategy — continuity of votes at the majority threshold and lack of preexisting 
differences in the neighborhood of pass — do hold, allowing us to estimate a 
causal effect. It also shows that the main distinguishing difference between firms 
in our sample and the sampling universe is firm size, which should therefore be 
 
20 The formal continuity test in Figure 2 (see McCrary 2008) rejects the discontinuity of the distribution at the majority 
threshold. Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012) show a similar lack of strategic behavior around the discontinuity for all 
shareholder-sponsored proposals, while Listokin (2008) documents that strategic withdrawal of proposals is a real issue for 
management-sponsored proposals (which implies this analysis should not be done on management proposals). Note that, as 
long as agents are not able to precisely predict the vote, any form of strategic voting would not affect the results at the 
discontinuity. This applies, among others to ISS recommendations and block holders. The results in Figures 3 and 4 
confirm that the market is not able to predict the vote outcomes with such precision. 
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taken into account when generalizing the results to a broader population of firms. 
4. Results 
4.1. The effect of Say-on-Pay on abnormal returns 
To evaluate the impact of Say-on-Pay provisions on shareholder value we first 
examine the market reaction to passing a Say-on-Pay proposal. Table 3 reports 
estimates of the difference in abnormal returns between Say-on-Pay proposals that 
pass and those that do not. Columns 1 to 5 present non-parametric estimates. To 
isolate the causal effect of Say-on-Pay on value, under our identification strategy, 
we estimateθ as the difference in abnormal returns between proposals that pass 
and those that do not pass for increasingly small intervals around the majority 
threshold. Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. As expected, we 
find that there is no difference, on average, between proposals that pass and those 
that fail (a small point estimate of -0.00210 that is not statistically different from 
zero) reflecting that for proposals that pass or fail by a large margin, the market 
has already incorporated the expected vote outcome in prices. Columns 2 and 3 
restrict the sample to within ten percentage points and five percentage points of 
the threshold, respectively. As we narrow the margin of votes around the pass 
threshold, we begin to see a small increase in the estimates, though the standard 
errors are still large. For votes within two and half percentage points of the 
threshold (column 4), we observe an estimate of 1.39% abnormal return that is 
significant at the 5% confidence level. Finally, if we narrow the window to within 
one and half percentage points, we observe that the estimate still follows an 
increasing pattern, reaching a statistically significant abnormal return of 1.88%. 
Column 6 shows our main specification for the entire sample, when we allow 
for a discontinuous jump at the majority threshold, and control for two 
polynomials of order three in the vote share on each side of it. The results are 
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consistent with the non-parametric ones: the abnormal return of firms that pass a 
Say-on-Pay proposal is 2.41% higher than for firms that do not pass such 
proposals. The point estimate in column 6 is larger and more precisely estimated 
than that in column 5, but the two estimates are not statistically different. 
Finally, in Column 7 we estimate the non-parametric CCT RD estimate and 
find a 2.73% higher abnormal return for proposals that pass. This estimate is not 
statistically different from the ones in Columns 6 and 7. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the same set of regressions using as an alternative 
benchmark the four factor model. We find a similar pattern of increasing 
estimates as we narrow the interval around the threshold. When fitting a 
polynomial on each side of the threshold or the CCT estimator we obtain an 
estimate of the differential abnormal return of 1.76% and 2.24% respectively. 
Another way of visualizing these results is to plot the abnormal returns on the 
day of the meeting. Figure 3 shows the impact of passing Say-on-Pay proposals 
on abnormal returns on the day of the vote. The daily abnormal returns were 
calculated from CRSP using the Market model for Figure 3 (results are similar 
with the four factor model). The graph plots the average daily abnormal return for 
the day of the meeting (t = 0) when the information of the vote is revealed; it is 
smoothed using a local linear regression approach.	The X-axis reflects the margin 
of victory (the vote share minus the threshold for that vote). On the day of the 
vote, Say-on-Pay proposals that pass by a small margin have positive abnormal 
returns. Comparing those to proposals that fail by a small margin gives us the 
effect of passing Say-on-Pay on abnormal returns. For votes further away from 
the threshold the abnormal return is indistinguishable from zero. One might be 
concerned that outliers could drive the shape of the figure, so in Figure 4 we 
replicate the exercise using medians: each point in the graph computes median 
(instead of mean) abnormal returns of the 20 nearest vote outcomes and shows 
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very similar results.21  
In our data, proposals that pass with a very small margin of victory (up to 3%) 
have a positive abnormal return, and this decreases sharply with the distance to 
the threshold, suggesting that the market is able to predict votes that pass by large 
margins. Similarly, proposals that fail by a small margin have a negative 
abnormal return, and the return is decreasing in the vote share to the left of the 
threshold. 
Even if a substantial part of the information about the vote is released on the 
day of the meeting, we explore any further gains (or potential reversals) beyond 
the day of the vote.22 Table 4 reports the regression discontinuity estimate for 
abnormal returns computed in different event windows around the day of the vote 
using both the polynomial and non-parametric CCT estimators. 
First, in column 1 the dependent variable is abnormal returns the day before 
the vote. The small and statistically insignificant coefficient indicates that the 
effect of Say-on-Pay is not foreseen by the market the day before the vote for any 
of the benchmarks in Panels A (Market Model) and B (Fama French and 
Momentum). The estimates are similar across estimation methods in each of the 
panels. Column 2 shows the effect on the day of the vote (identical to column 6 of 
Table 3). Next, in Column 3 onwards we find that passing a Say-on-Pay proposal 
delivers abnormal returns beyond the day of the vote. Column 3 shows the impact 
on a two-day window that includes the day of the vote and the following day. The 
coefficients are between 2.2% (CCT estimator) and 2.4% (polynomial) for the 
market model and 2% (CCT estimator) 2.1% (polynomial) for the four factor 
model, which are close to the ones on the day of the vote and statistically 
 
21 Each point in the y axis represents the median abnormal return (on the day of the vote) of the ten nearest votes along 
each side of the x axis. The discrete jumps in the graph correspond to changes in the median observation as the window 
changes. The advantage of this approach is that the results are not sensitive to the presence of outliers or driven by a few 
observations. 
22 Say-on-Pay proposals are closely followed by the media. Moreover, a variety of channels such as newswires and real-
time broadcasts disclose the vote outcome on the day of the annual meeting.  
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significant. Column 4 displays similar estimates for the two-week window: 2% to 
2.5% for the market model and 2.4% to 3.7% for the four factor model. Finally, 
Column 5 shows growing estimates between 3.2% and 7.2%, for cumulative 
returns up to six weeks; indicating that there is no reversal six weeks after the 
vote. Standard errors are much larger (and estimates not significant) in longer 
windows, since there are many other events driving stock prices and creating 
noise, although the fact that there is no reversal in the estimated coefficients 
suggests that the Say-on-Pay effect is persistent. 
In principle, the only characteristic that changes discontinuously at the 
majority threshold is the probability of implementing Say-on-Pay. Given that Say-
on-Pay is a relatively homogeneous policy, this allows us to identify Say-on-Pay 
as a specific channel for value creation; which is an important advantage relative 
to pooling different proposals as in Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012). To further 
understand that the captured effect is not common to all compensation-related 
shareholder proposals or mechanically associated with shareholders winning a 
close call vote we evaluate the market response to other pay related proposals. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show the results of running a similar regression 
discontinuity design on the population of compensation-related shareholder 
proposals (excluding Say-on-Pay) in 1997-2010 (where data are available, in 
column 8) and in 2006-2010 (same sample period as the Say-on-Pay proposals, in 
column 9). The effect of these proposals at the discontinuity is statistically 
insignificant, and typically has a negative sign. This heterogeneity in the results 
suggests that Say-on-Pay is perceived as being quite different from other 
compensation-related proposals by the market: The market doesn’t just respond 
positively to a proposal passing, but to a specific type of proposal passing. It is 
not the case that any positive vote triggers a positive market reaction. 
Finally, to ensure that the changes we are finding are effectively related to the 
50% threshold and do not occur at other points in the distribution, in Table 5 we 
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show four placebo tests for the RD design where instead of the majority threshold 
we use the median vote share within the sample with vote share > 50% (column 
3), the median vote share within the sample with vote share <50% (column 4), a 
vote cutoff of -5%  (column 5) and +5% cutoff (column 6). We find there is no 
discontinuity in returns at those thresholds (or at any other that we tested but do 
not report here), confirming that there is something distinct about the actual 
majority threshold, as per our maintained assumption. 
Overall, we find that the large positive market reaction to passing a Say-on-Pay 
proposal is sustained and even increases following the vote. We perform two 
robustness checks in Appendix table A3 related to the presence of other proposals 
and the dynamics of abnormal returns.23 First, we directly control for other 
governance proposals that are voted on in the same annual meeting by adding 
them linearly to equation (2) with polynomials, and including another polynomial 
in the vote share for those proposals. The results on Say-on-Pay are similar (See 
columns 1 and 3 of Table A3) after including these controls (there is a positive 
effect of other proposals that is driven by anti-takeover provisions, as in Cuñat, 
Gine and Guadalupe 2012). Second, we use a dynamic RD estimator that 
estimates the effect of the vote on all periods simultaneously and also controls for 
other proposals (and their vote share polynomial) (see Columns 2 and 4 in Table 
A3).  The results are again very similar. This confirms that the vote outcome of 
other proposals is not systematically related to the outcome of the Say-on-Pay 
vote around the discontinuity. In the following sections we go beyond the stock 
market reaction and explore the different channels that may be driving this market 
reaction. 
 
4.2. Implementation 
 
23 The methodology in Table A3 follows Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012) and is described in the Appendix. 
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This section documents how much the implementation probability of a Say-on-
Pay proposal changes at the majority threshold, with three main objectives in 
mind. First, given that the vote outcome on shareholder proposals is typically non-
binding it is important to establish whether passing a proposal has an impact on 
implementation. Second, our identification strategy relies on a discontinuity (a 
discrete change) in the implementation probability of a Say-on-Pay proposal at 
the majority threshold, so it is important to explicitly test for this assumption.24  
Finally, while we have established the market reaction to passing a proposal, this 
market reaction takes into account the fact that proposals will be implemented 
with a certain probability. In order to estimate the actual value of implementing a 
Say-on-Pay proposal we need to re-scale the market reaction, dividing by the 
discrete change in the probability of implementation around the vote threshold 
between passing and not passing.  
We collected complete implementation data from SEC filings for all voted 
proposals in our sample. In particular we recorded whether the proposal was 
implemented before the following annual meeting. The graph in Figure 5 
illustrates the empirical probability of implementing a proposal using a flexible 
function of the vote on each side of the discontinuity.25 The probability of 
implementation increases almost monotonically in the vote share, but we observe 
a discrete jump at the majority threshold. Table 6 estimates the size of the jump at 
the discontinuity. Column 1 shows that for the whole sample, a proposal that 
passes has a 52.5% higher probability of being implemented than one that does 
not. This is an average estimate for all vote outcomes, whereas we seek to 
estimate whether the probability of implementation changes just around the 
 
24 The focus on a homogeneous and well-defined policy like Say-on-Pay, joint with detailed information about 
implementation helps to establish that the actual policy is the main channel of the reported effects.  
25 In particular, we use a series of local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 5.2% votes as suggested by the CCT 
approach. 
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discontinuity. To do so we replicate the analysis in Table 3 and estimate how 
passing a proposal changes the probability of implementation for increasingly 
small vote intervals around the majority threshold. Intuitively, passing should lead 
to a lower differential probability of implementation as we narrow the interval. 
However, around 1.5% of the majority threshold (Column 5), the differential 
probability of implementation is still quite high (45.8%) and statistically 
significant. Columns 6 and 7 display, respectively, the polynomial based and the 
CCT estimates: We obtain a coefficient between 39% and 52.5%, depending on 
the estimation method. 
With this estimate of the probability of implementation in hand we can provide 
a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the value of a Say-on-Pay proposal. Using the 
abnormal returns from Table 3 of between 1.76% and 2.7%, and re-scaling by a 
probability of implementation around the threshold of 52.5%, the value of 
adopting a Say-on-Pay proposal is estimated to be about 3.4% to 5.1%.26 
4.3. The effect of Say-on-Pay on firm outcomes 
We have established that the market reaction to passing a Say-on-Pay 
provision is positive. This may reflect market perceptions of the potential cost-
savings and managerial efficiency gains as a result of the Say-on-Pay provision. 
As described in Section 2, there are at least two channels by which Say-on-Pay 
can deliver better firm performance: first, through a stricter alignment of pay with 
performance; second, through more efficient monitoring and the risk of the CEO 
being dismissed if the outcome of the regular Say-on-Pay votes is very negative. 
Given that a negative outcome on the subsequent Say-on-Pay votes sends a very 
 
26 This re-scaling gives an approximation of the actual effect of implementation. It is equivalent to the point estimate of an 
IV regression. Although within our sample we cannot estimate the first stage of an IV regression with enough precision, we 
show in Table 3 that the jump in implementation is statistically different from zero. This is consistent with the previous 
governance literature that also finds that there is a jump in implementation at the majority threshold of non-binding 
shareholder proposals. 
27 
 
negative signal, the CEO may change behavior out of concern for his/her career. 
In this section we evaluate the effects of Say-on-Pay proposals that may result 
from closer monitoring and better contractual incentives.  
Table 7 shows the impact of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on variables that 
capture firm profitability, long-term performance and other real outcomes. Each 
cell corresponds to a different regression that measures the effect of passing a 
proposal at the discontinuity. We show results using the non-parametric CCT 
estimator (results using third order polynomials on each side of the majority 
threshold can be found in Table A4). Each column corresponds to a different 
dependent variable and each panel to a different year-to-year effect. 
We denote as year t the year in which the Say-on-Pay proposal is voted. 
Annual meetings are held between two fiscal year ends, which is when the 
variables used in this and the following sections are recorded.27 Therefore we 
define the time periods such that there are at least six months between the annual 
meeting when the vote is held and fiscal year end t. This means that the change 
between t and t -1 includes some pre-treatment months and at least six of the first 
post-treatment months. The dependent variables in the first panel measure 
changes in the variables from t-1 to t. In the second they measure changes from 
the end of the year of the vote t until the first full year after the Say-on-Pay vote 
(t+1). Estimating real effects in an RDD design can be challenging in small 
samples for several reasons that we tackle in the following way: First, cross 
sectional heterogeneity could affect the results, for this reason all variables are 
expressed either in first differences or growth rates. Second, ratios and 
transformed variables could be subject to the presence of outliers, so variables are  
 
27 Most of the proxy season takes place between April and June - 88% of the proposals in our sample take place before 
June. 
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winsorized at the 5% level28. Finally, the significance threshold may require large 
point estimates, so tables should be read as a whole, taking into account the 
implications of small sample sizes on our estimates. 
Table 7 reports the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on commonly used 
profitability measures. We define the dependent variables in this table as changes 
within the firm to identify the within-firm effect of Say-on-Pay. Overall, Table 7 
shows that there are no significant effects of Say-on-Pay between t-1 and t, but 
significant increases in profitability between t and t+1. More specifically, firms 
passing Say-on-Pay have a 5.1% higher return on assets, and a 4.7% higher return 
on operating assets between t and t+1. All these effects are significant and 
economically quite large (in relative terms, the size of the effect is 0.7 standard 
deviations in both cases), which is consistent with the large market value effects 
found earlier. They also have higher Tobin’s Q (16%) and return on equity 
(7.5%), although these are not significant at standard levels. 
How is this better performance attained? We investigate whether Say-on-Pay 
led to reductions in costs, which should be higher in poorly governed firms with 
less efficient monitoring. Column 5 of Table 7 shows a reduction in capital 
expenditure growth, and column 6 shows a reduction in overheads (SG&A) as a 
result of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal. Note that these are marginally 
statistically significant in Table 7 using the CCT estimator, but they are in 
Appendix Table A4 using the polynomial estimator. Overall, this is suggestive of 
an improvement in the firms’ efficiency of operation and potentially of higher 
CEO discipline, but unfortunately we have no power to provide more than 
suggestive evidence.  
In Figures 6 and 7 we report the graphical representation of out RD estimates, 
 
28 We ran all our results winsorizing at 2% with similar results; we chose to keep the more conservative cut-off (5%), to 
make sure our results were not driven by outliers since the 2% cut is more likely to retain extreme observations, which are 
more problematic when the total number of observations is relatively small. 
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along with 0.5% bins of data averages. We do this for the overheads and returns 
on assets variables, where we found significant RD results. The graphs show that 
the RD result seems to be quite “global” on the left hand side of the graph (i.e. the 
effect to the left of the threshold seems to be quite constant even as we move 
away from the discontinuity), but quite local on the right hand side (within 3% to 
5% of the discontinuity. We think this is partly due to the fact that 60% of the 
observations to the right of the discontinuity fall within the 0 to 5% interval, and 
there are few observations beyond 5%. It may also be the case that firms that pass 
a proposal by more than 5% are special in some sense (e.g. shareholders are very 
disgruntled with management or past performance has been abnormally poor), so 
there are important omitted factors that are being captured by the continuous 
function. In any case, this highlights the fact that our estimates are local and that 
we need to be cautious when extrapolating. 
In sum, CEOs and executives seem to be reacting to the Say-on-Pay provision 
by delivering better earnings and returns to shareholders. This performance 
improvement seems to be accompanied by improved efficiency. However, we 
must keep in mind the lack of power in our estimates may not allow us to estimate 
more significant effects.29  
 The estimates on performance are economically quite significant, which 
suggests that the changes in behavior accompanying Say-on-Pay around the 
threshold are significant and consistent with the market value response, although 
we cannot rule out that some of these effects are short lived or the result of 
earnings manipulation. The effects identified arise mainly 6 to 18 months after the 
Say-on-Pay proposal is passed – we cannot analyze a longer time period because 
in 2011 all firms were subjected to Say-on-Pay. Moreover, since these are local 
 
29 We looked at other potential outcomes as drivers of changes in performance measures, but were not able to identify a 
consistent story. For instance, we looked at whether SoP increased total payout or share repurchases, and found estimates 
that are not statistically different from zero. 
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effects, we must be cautious about extrapolation – i.e., whether we can expect 
such large effects to apply to firms outside our sample or far from the 
discontinuity. However, at the very least our results suggest that firms where 
proposals failed by a small margin would have benefited from it passing.  
4.4. The effect of Say-on-Pay on CEO compensation 
The main objective of Say-on-Pay proposals is to affect CEO pay, either by 
reducing it or improving the alignment of CEO incentives with firm objectives. In 
this section we examine whether passing a Say-on-Pay proposal has an impact on 
the level and on the incentive structure of CEO pay. 
In Table 8 we report the effect of Say-on-Pay at the discontinuity threshold on 
changes in different elements of CEO compensation. We measure all the 
monetary variables in percentage growth rates so that the reported effects can be 
interpreted as the differential growth in the variable between firms that approve or 
reject Say-on-Pay by a close margin. Column 1 reports the effect on total CEO 
compensation. We do not observe a statistically significant change in the growth 
rates of CEO compensation in the two years following the passing of a Say-on-
Pay proposal. Column 2 reports the effect of Say-on-Pay on the probability of 
CEO turnover. If Say-on-Pay proposals induce better shareholder monitoring, 
they may increase the probability of turnover. On the other hand, CEOs may 
respond by performing better, offsetting the increased monitoring and lowering 
the chance of being dismissed. The estimates for the effect on the probability of 
turnover are not significant, so CEO exit is comparable between firms that pass 
Say-on-Pay and those that do not (one cannot accurately distinguish between 
voluntary and forced departures with the existing data).  
Next we look into the changes on CEO compensation within firms that do not 
change their CEO. Column 3 reports a similar pattern to Column 1, and the 
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estimates are again not statistically different from zero. Taken together, the results 
in Columns 1 to 3 show no significant effects of Say-on-Pay on total CEO 
compensation or turnover. 
We now turn to the different components of CEO pay. Columns 4 to 8 report 
the impact of passing Say-on-Pay on different components of total compensation. 
Column 4 shows a significant change in salary after the passing of the Say-on-Pay 
proposal, in line with the results in Table A5 using the polynomial estimator. 
Column 5 reports the effect on increases in variable compensation (granting of 
stock, options and bonus) and shows no particular differential pattern between 
firms that pass Say-on-Pay proposals and those that do not. Columns 6 to 8 focus 
on options and stocks. The results suggest an increase in the growth of the option 
portfolio (column 6), the stock portfolio (column 7) and the delta of the stock and 
option portfolio in the period (i.e. its sensitivity to firm value) immediately 
following the vote, followed by a significant increase in some of those three 
variables between t and t+1 (column 8).30 Note that the increase in performance-
pay sensitivity could be induced by higher grants of options and shares, or more 
‘mechanically’ through changes in the share price of firms.   
Overall, the results in this section show no systematic or sustained effects of 
Say-on-Pay on CEO compensation. Total pay does not change significantly (other 
than a small decline in salary), and the different components of compensation do 
not change in an identifiable and consistent manner. While some results might be 
suggestive of a shift from fixed pay to more variable pay (consistent with the 
stated objectives of most Say-on-Pay proposals) this conclusion is not robust 
across different measures. The absence of a significant effect on pay levels or pay 
structure can result from Say-on-Pay having no effect on pay, but could also be 
explained by adjustments in pay packages that are heterogeneous across firms. 
 
30 The total delta of the portfolio measures the change in the dollar value of the stock and option portfolio per dollar change 
in the value of the firm stock and is calculated following Core and Guay (1999).  
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Even if there is room for improvement in CEO pay packages, the deviation from 
the optimal contract may vary across firms: If each firm responds in a different 
way or requires a different treatment, this would induce imprecise estimates of the 
average effect of Say-on-Pay.31 In any case, we do not find a significant and 
systematic reduction in compensation across firms as a result of Say-on-Pay. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Say-on-Pay gives shareholders a mechanism to express their voice, their view 
on how the firm is run and on whether CEO pay policies are aligned with 
performance. Therefore it can affect firm value through several channels – i.e., by 
affecting firm performance through better designed pay structures that motivate 
CEOs. It also lowers the shareholder cost of expressing dissent, and therefore 
makes monitoring by shareholders more attractive and effective. Conversely, it 
can have a negative effect on performance if it imposes large costs on firms.  
We find that adopting Say-on-Pay can generate substantial value for 
shareholders. The use of a regression discontinuity design on the outcomes of 
shareholders proposals to adopt a Say-on-Pay policy allows us to deal with the 
presence of prior expectations in an event study setting, and to estimate the causal 
effect of adopting the policy. Say-on-Pay proposals that pass yield, on average, an 
abnormal return of 1.8% to 2.7% relative to those that fail on the day of the vote. 
We estimate the actual value of adopting a Say-on-Pay proposal to be around 5% 
of firm value, an economically sizeable effect that potentially arises through 
different channels. 
In our sample of firms that were target of Say-on-pay proposals, those that 
passed Say-on-Pay display stronger performance outcomes. CEOs seem to be 
 
31 Given our identification strategy, unfortunately the sample size does not allow us for a thorough exploration of these 
heterogeneous effects.  
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reacting to having a Say-on-Pay provision in place by delivering stronger 
profitability. We also find that Say-on-Pay leads to higher labor productivity and 
reductions in overheads and capital expenditure. In short, Say-on-Pay provisions 
appear to lead to more efficiency and better firm performance. 
We find no significant or systematic effect of Say-on-Pay on total CEO 
compensation or pay composition. Despite this, we cannot rule out the idea that 
adjustments to pay packages may be heterogeneous across firms. Even if there is 
room for improvement in CEO pay packages, not all firms necessarily respond in 
the same way. If each firm requires different treatment, this would lead to 
imprecise estimates of the effect of Say-on-Pay. 
We interpret the sizable and significant effects of Say on Pay on firm value and 
performance as potentially reflecting the fact that losing a Say-on-Pay vote is a 
very negative signal that increases the likelihood of future shareholder actions. 
These may include dismissal and can have damaging effects for CEO’s reputation 
and careers. This “career concerns” motive creates an incentive to improve 
performance (Fama, 1980). Note that, many of these reputational concerns may 
operate off equilibrium; so, in equilibrium, we need not see any firings or 
shareholder actions, since the threat of Say on Pay should make CEOs take the 
appropriate actions to improve firm performance and reduce shareholders’ 
concerns. However, consistent with a career concerns motive, during the 2011-
2013 proxy seasons losing the Say on Pay vote triggered the dismissal of CEOs in 
several instances. Some salient examples are Leo Apotheker at Hewlett-Packard, 
David Brennar at AstraZeneca, Andrew Moss at Aviva and Vikram Pandit at 
Citigroup. In other cases, the failure to approve the Say on Pay vote led 
shareholders to file lawsuits against management to demand further changes in 
the executive team. 
So, overall we interpret our results as reflecting the fact that Say-on-Pay 
empowers shareholders by offering a mechanism (a “vote of confidence”) through 
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which they can express dissent towards poorly performing CEOs, as a result of 
which CEOs take actions to improve firm performance. This interpretation is 
consistent with mounting evidence that failed Say on Pay votes in the post Dodd 
Frank period follow poor firm performance (Ferracone and  Harris, 2011; Cotter, 
Palmiter and Thomas, 2013) and that Say on Pay increases the voice of small 
shareholders (Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers, 2014).  
Thus, our paper provides evidence of the potentially large and positive effects 
of Say on Pay on firm value and performance which complements existing work 
(e.g. for UK firms in Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu 2011; for smaller US firms in Iliev 
and Vitanova 2014). Spelling out the precise mechanisms through which Say on 
Pay operates is an important topic for future research. 
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Figures and Tables  
Figure 1: Distribution of Votes
 
Figure 2: Continuity of Votes  
Following (McCrary 2008) 
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Figure 3: Abnormal Returns ‐ Day of the Vote
 
Non-parametric local linear regression of market model returns using an 
Epanechnikov weight and a bandwidth according to CCT. Bullet points 
show averages in 0.5% bins.  
Figure 4: Abnormal Returns – Day of the Vote
Medians 
Median returns of market model on a window of twenty observations 
Figure 5: Probability of Implementation 
Non-parametric local linear regression of the probability of implementation within one 
year using an Epanechnikov weight and a bandwidth according to CCT and 10% 
confidence intervals. Bullet points show averages in 2% bins. 
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Figure 6: Overheads: t to 1+1 
 
Non-parametric local linear regression of Overheads Change 
using an Epanechnikov weight and a bandwidth according to CCT. 
Bullet points show averages in 0.5% bins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Return on Assets: t to 1+1 
 
Non-parametric local linear regression of Return on Assets 
using an Epanechnikov weight and a bandwidth according to CCT. 
Bullet points show averages in 0.5% bins. 
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TABLE 1 
Shareholder Say-on-Pay Proposals  
This table displays the frequency of Say on Pay voted proposals, the percent of passed and the 
average support over time.  Data is collected by Riskmetrics on all shareholders Say on Pay 
proposals from 2006 until 2010 for all S&P 1,500 companies plus an additional 500 widely 
held firms. For all of our observations the threshold to pass a proposal is 50%.  
Shareholder Proposal Summary Statistics 
Year Voted Proposals 
Passed 
Proposals 
Percentage 
Passed 
Proposals 
Average 
Vote 
Outcome 
# -5, +5 # -10,+10 
2006 7 0 0% 40.11 0 5 
2007 51 6 11.76% 40.9 13 31 
2008 68 9 13.24% 41.35 21 43 
2009 78 24 30.77% 45.97 35 54 
2010 46 12 26.09% 44.93 19 35 
Total 250 51 20.4% 43.33 88 168 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics  
This table describes the Say on Pay sample of 250 voted proposals. All accounting variables are obtained from Compustat: Market Value (mkvalt_f), Tobin's Q is 
defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of assets (AT), and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit 
(TXDITC), Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on Assets (NI/AT), OROA (Cashflow/Total Assets),  Leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/AT), Overheads 
(XSGA/XOPR), Total Payout  ((DVT+PRSTKC)/AT), Sales per Worker (SALE/EMP), Number of Employees (EMP).  CEO Pay is defined as TDC1 in 
Execucomp. Abnormal Pay is defined as the absolute deviation of pay residuals. Variable compensation is the sum of options and stock awards. Option portfolio 
is the Black-Scholes value of the options including reloads. Stock Portfolio is the total value of shares excluding options. Delta Portfolio is the delta for both the 
option and stock portfolios. Ownership variables are generated from Thomson 13F database.  All monetary values are in 2010 US$. Note that the number of 
observations may change due to missing values in some of the variables. 
 Mean Median
Std. 
dev. 
10th 
Per. 
90th 
Per.  Mean Median 
Std. 
dev. 
10th 
Per. 
90th 
Per. 
Market Value ($mil) 54,877 30,648 59,002 2,805 160,612 CEO Pay (Thou.) 15,088 13,543 10,000 4,118 30,501 
Tobin Q 1.59 1.35 0.66 0.96 2.71 Abnormal Pay -532.6 -691.74 7,792 -10,383 11,397 
Earnings per Share (EPS) 2.30 2.38 2.60 0.84 5.60 Salary (Thou.) 1,337 1,237 5,961 1,472 17,002 
Return on Equity 0.12 0.134 0.211 -0.10 0.35 Variable Compensation 8,323 6,918 5,961 1,472 17,002 
Return on Assets  0.11 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.22 Option Portfolio 40,814 20,260 52,744 1,375 104,769 
OROA (Cashflow/Total 
Assets) 0.08 0.09 0.065 0.002 0.16 Stock Portfolio 63,734 21,499 103,496 3,156 186,479 
Net Income 3,501 2,017 4,256 -107 11,917 Delta Portfolio 1,628 747 1,979 160 4,609 
Leverage (Debt/Assets) 0.27 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.55 Share of Stock Awards 0.31 0.32 0.24 0 0.67 
Total Payout  0.058 0.044 0.053 0.003 0.15 Shate of Option Awards 0.23 0.21 0.21 0 0.58 
Overheads (SGA/Op.Exp.) 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.06 0.55 Share of Bonus 0.04 0 0.10 0 0.20 
Capex/ Assets 0.042 0.032 0.34 0.002 0.096 Share of Perks 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.004 0.08 
Number Employees 
(Thousands) 96.7 55.4 107.2 5.8 312.02 Share of Deferred Comp. 0.016 0.001 0.101 0 0.13 
Sales per Worker 653 422 584 213 1,479 Ownership by Instit. Sh. 0.72 0.71 0.12 0.56 0.89 
Total Sales 44,967 26,473 48,966 2,755 119,435 Ownership by Top 5 Sh. 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.16 0.35 
Total Assets 115,486 39,437 211,754 4,399 260,303            
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TABLE 3 
Abnormal Returns around the Majority Threshold 
This table presents regressions of the abnormal returns on the day of the meeting t=0, on whether the Say-
on-Pay proposal passed.  Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks: Market Model, and Fama 
French and momentum factors from Carhart (1997). Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. 
Column 2 restricts the sample to observations with a vote share within ten points of the threshold, column 3 
to five points and so forth. Column 6 introduces a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 (Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010), one on each side of the threshold, and uses the full sample. Column 7 uses the non-
parametric approach proposed by Calonico,  Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). All columns control for year 
fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Market Model  
Polynomial order 3 CCT  
  All votes -10;+10 -5;+5 -2.5;+2.5 -1.5;+1.5 Full Model SoP 
Pass -0.00210 0.000462 0.00433 0.0139** 0.0188** 0.0241*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.00316) (0.00381) (0.00472) (0.00603) (0.00696) (0.00889) (0.009) 
Bandwidth   4.406 
Obs 250 168 88 43 28 250 250 
R-sq/ Z 0.017 0.000 0.013 0.140 0.253 0.091 2.89 
B. Fama French & Momentum 
Polynomial order 3 CCT  
  All votes -10;+10 -5;+5 -2.5;+2.5 -1.5;+1.5 Full Model SoP 
Pass -0.00389 -0.00320 -0.000276 0.00864 0.0151** 0.0176** 0.0224*** 
 (0.00320) (0.00393) (0.00484) (0.00598) (0.00678) (0.00861) (0.0096) 
Bandwidth   4.412 
Obs 250 168 88 43 28 250 250 
R-sq/ Z 0.028 0.007 0.000 0.059 0.179 0.078 2.33 
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TABLE 4 
Abnormal Returns beyond the Day of the Meeting  
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on abnormal returns 
around different event windows. Column 1 reports the effect of pass one day before the 
meeting. Column 2 reports the effect on the day of the meeting. Column 3, 4 and 5 report 
the effect of pass on the cumulative abnormal returns for two days, one week and one 
month respectively. Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks: Market 
Model and Fama French and momentum factors from Carhart (1997).  The specification 
is equation (2) using a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the 
threshold (Lee and Lemieux (2010)) and the non-parametric approach proposed by 
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). All columns control for year fixed effects; 
standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Market Model  
  day before 
vote 
day of vote two days two weeks six weeks 
Polynomial order 3     
Pass 0.00552 0.0241*** 0.0242* 0.0254 0.0516 
 (0.0076) (0.0088) (0.0128) (0.0323) (0.0499) 
R-squared 0.113 0.091 0.085 0.060 0.088 
CCT 
Pass 0.007 0.0273*** 0.221** 0.020 0.032 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.032) (0.057) 
Bandwidth 5.522 4.406 4.689 4.951 4.785 
Obs 250 250 250 250 250 
Z 0.9 2.89 1.82 0.62 0.56 
B. Fama French & Momentum 
  day before 
vote 
day of vote two days two weeks six weeks 
Polynomial order 3     
Pass 0.00236 0.0176** 0.0211** 0.0240 0.0716 
 (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0106) (0.0265) (0.0478) 
R-squared 0.074 0.078 0.088 0.047 0.030 
CCT 
Pass 0.005 0.0224** 0.020** 0.037 0.067 
 (0.009) (0.0096) (0.010) (0.027) (0.04) 
Bandwidth 4.447 4.412 4.660 4.466 4.687 
Obs 250 250 250 250 250 
Z 0.56 2.33 1.95 1.37 1.44 
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TABLE 5 
Other Compensation Proposals and Placebo Tests  
This table presents the effect of passing other compensation proposals on abnormal returns on the day 
of the meeting t=0.  Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks: Market Model and Fama 
French and momentum factors from Carhart (1997). Column 1 uses all compensation proposals from 
1997 to 2010 and column 2 all compensation proposal during the same period as the Say-on-Pay 
sample. Columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 use the Say on Pay universe with different placebo cuts as thresholds: 
the median vote for all SoP votes below the majority threshold in column 3; the median vote for votes 
above the majority thresholdin column 4; -5% from the majority threshold in column 5 and +5% in 
column 6. All columns use the non-parametric approach proposed by Calonico,  Cattaneo and Titiunik 
(2014) and control for year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Market Model  
Other Compensation Proposals Placebo tests for Different Vote Thresholds  
 
Comp 1997-
2010 
Comp 2006-
2010 
Median Vote  
[-50,0) 
Median Vote 
[0,50] -5 +5 
Pass -0.004 -0.023 -0.004 0.007 -0.0009 -0.0061 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.0042) (0.0187) 
Bandwidth 12.60 5.42 5.92 3.29 6.03 5.69 
Obs 1022 315 250 250 250 250 
Z -0.68 -1.50 -1.00 0.471 -0.22 -0.327 
B. Fama French & Momentum 
 
Comp 1997-
2010 
Comp 2006-
2010 
Median Vote  
[-50,0) 
Median Vote 
[0,50] -5 +5 
Pass -0.0003 -0.022 0.0126 -0.0015 0.0009 -0.0007 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.0167) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0191) 
Bandwidth 10.93 4.90 3.21 6.86 6.28 5.67 
Obs 1022 315 250 250 250 250 
Z -0.06 -1.71 0.75 0.36 0.20 -0.03 
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of Pass on Implementation 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on Implementation. 
Column 1 estimates are based on the whole sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to 
observations with a vote share within ten points of the threshold, column 3 to five points 
and so forth. Column 6 introduces a polynomial in the vote share of order 3  (Lee and 
Lemieux (2010)), one on each side of the threshold, and uses the full sample. Column 7 
uses the non-parametric approach proposed by Calonico,  Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). 
All columns control for year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  All -10;+10 -5;+5 -2.5;+2.5 -1.5;+1.5 Full Model CCT 
Pass 0.525*** 0.470*** 0.482*** 0.393** 0.458** 0.525** 0.39* 
(0.0810) (0.0981) (0.114) (0.167) (0.214) (0.240) (0.24) 
Bandwidth 5.23 
Obs 201 132 68 31 20 201 201 
R-sq/Z 0.344 0.241 0.261 0.159 0.222 0.365 1.6 
 
TABLE 7 
Effect of Say-on-Pay Proposals on Firm Profitability 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on firm profitability. The specification is 
equation (2) using  the non-parametric approach proposed by Calonico,  Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). 
The dependent variables are obtained from Compustat are all defined as changes. Column 1 reports 
changes in Tobin's Q, which is defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the 
book value of assets (AT), and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC). 
Column 2, 3 and 4 report the change in Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), in Return on Assets 
(NI/AT) and in the Operating Return on Assets (CashFlow /AT), respectivewly. Column 5 and 6 report 
changes in the Capex ratio (Capex/AT) and in Overheads (XSGA/XOPR).  All dependent variables are 
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, 
**, and *** respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Tobin Q 
Change ROE Change ROA Change
OROA 
(CashFlow 
/AT) Change
Capex/ 
Total 
Assets 
Change 
Overheads 
Change 
Effect from t-1 to t 
Pass 0.111 0.06 0.017 0.025 -0.013 0.006 
(0.114) (0.058) (0.02) (0.01) 0.006 0.007 
Bandwidth 5.59 4.35 4.08 4.29 4.92 4.76 
Obs. 241 250 250 247 245 209 
Z 0.97 1.05 0.70 1.27 -2.0 0.89 
Effect from t to t+1 
Pass 0.157 0.075 0.051*** 0.047*** -0.0085 -0.013* 
(0.12) (0.059) (0.017) (0.017) (0.0056) (0.0078) 
Bandwidth 8.47 6.14 4.78 4.57 6.53 5.08 
Obs. 184 192 192 188 189 158 
Z 1.09 1.3 2.77 2.49 -1.51 -1.69 
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TABLE 8 
Changes in the Level of Compensation 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on compensation measures. The specification is equation (2) using  the non-
parametric approach proposed by Calonico,  Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014).The dependent variables are obtained from Execucomp. Column 1 
reports growth in Total Compensation (TDC1), column 2 the change in CEO Turnover and column 3 growth in Total Compensation within CEO.  
Column 4 reports growth in Salary and column 5 growth in Variable Compensation (Stock_awards_fv+Option_awards_fv+Bonus+ 
Noneq_Incent). Column 6 and 7 report growth in Option and Stock Portfolio, respectively. Column 8 reports growth in Stock and Option 
Portfolio Delta. All dependent variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Total 
Compensation 
Growth 
Change in 
CEO 
(Turnover) 
Total 
Compensation 
Growth 
Salary 
Growth 
Variable 
Compensation 
Growth 
Option 
Portfolio 
Growth 
Stock 
Portfolio 
Growth 
Delta Growth 
Stock & 
Option 
Portfolio 
Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO 
Effect from t-1 to t 
Pass 0.016 0.099 0.030 0.0007 -0.008 0.147 -0.124 -0.13 
 
(0.132) (0.065) (0.128) (0.016) (0.150) (0.479) (0.254) (0.228) 
Bandwidth 4.72 4.77 6.33 6.59 5.41 5.61 4.91 5.69 
Obs 233 238 210 208 201 194 204 201 
Z 0.124 1.51 0.23 0.04 -0.05 0.30 -0.48 -0.57 
Effect from t to t+1 
Pass -0.43 -0.043 -0.435 -0.041* -0.485 1.05*** 0.212 0.448** 
 (0.273) (0.059) (0.281) (0.024) (0.347) (0.314) (0.40) (0.220) 
Bandwidth 4.54 4.92 4.68 6.27 4.83 5.43 6.37 4.81 
Obs 179 179 159 157 153 143 153 154 
Z -1.59 -0.73 -1.54 -1.68 -1.39 3.35 0.52 2.00 
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  Appendix  
TABLE A1 
 Sample Selection 
This table compares the Say on Pay sample of 250 voted proposals with the SP1500 universe for the 
same years. As well, it compares the Say on Pay Close votes sample (within 10 percentage points) 
with the full Say on Pay sample. All accounting variables are obtained from Compustat: Market Value 
(mkvalt_f), Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the 
book value of assets (AT), and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC), 
Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), Return on Assets (NI/AT), OROA (Cashflow/Total Assets),  
Leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/AT), Overheads (XSGA/XOPR), Total Payout  ((DVT+PRSTKC)/AT), 
Sales per Worker (SALE/EMP), Number of Employees (EMP).  CEO Pay is defined as TDC1 in 
Execucomp. Abnormal Pay is defined as the absolute deviation of pay residuals. Ownership variables 
are generated from Thomson 13F database.  All monetary values are in 2010 US$. Note that the 
number of observations may change due to missing values in some of the variables. 
  SoP vs. SP1500  
 SoP Close (+10/-10) vs. 
SoP  
 
Mean 
SoP  
Mean 
SP1500  t-test 
Mean 
Close t-test  
Market Value ($mil) 54,877 6,749 12.8 65,326 0.55 
Tobin Q 1.6 1.76 -3.8 1.67 0.60 
Return on Equity 0.12 0.10 1.3 0.04 -0.13 
Return on Assets  0.11 0.12 -0.83 0.119 0.64 
OROA (Cashflow/Total Assets) 0.086 0.091 -1.22 0.084 0.60 
Leverage (Debt/Assets) 0.27 0.20 6.5 0.26 -0.46 
Total Payout  0.058 0.044 4 0.069 1.48 
Overheads (SGA/Op.Exp.) 0.28 0.31 -2.0 0.27 -0.55 
Number Employees (Thousands) 96.7 15.6 11.2 101 -1.25 
Sales per Worker 653 488 4.4 832 0.86 
CEO Pay (Thousands) 15,088 5,204 15.4 15,875 -0.26 
Abnormal Pay -532.6 -171 -0.72 -716 -0.54 
Ownership by Instit. Shareholders 0.72 0.78 -7.8 0.71 -0.59 
Ownership by Top 5 Shareholders 0.24 0.29 -11.4 0.22 -2.1 
Number Shareholders own >  5% 2.0 2.7 -8.01 1.9 -1.51 
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TABLE A2 
 Pre-differences in Firm Characteristics as a Function of the Vote Outcome 
Table A2 tests whether passing a Say-on-Pay vote on the meeting date is systematically related to firm 
characteristics prior to the meeting. Note that in Panel A t refers to days, while for the rest, t refers to years. 
Each row corresponds to a different dependent variable and each entry comes from a separate regression. 
Each entry in the table reports the coefficient on whether a proposal passed.  Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) 
report the estimated effect of passing a vote on outcome variable levels (changes) the year before the annual 
meeting, t-1 (between t-2 and t-1). Columns 1 and 3 present estimates without controlling for a polynomial 
in the vote share and, therefore, estimate the average effect of passing relative to not passing. Columns 2 
and 4 include the polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold such that it 
effectively estimates the effect at the discontinuity.  All columns control for year fixed effects and standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 
indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
  Before meeting (t-1) Change, from (t-2) to (t-1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A.       
Abnormal Return one day before 
Meeting, Car (-1,-1) OLS -0.007* 0.006 -0.020 0.021 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.030) 
Abnormal Return one day before 
Meeting, Car (-1,-1) FFM -0.007* 0.002 -0.020 0.003 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.033) 
B.      
Tobin Q   -0.179 -0.192 0.017 0.098 
(0.160) (0.505) (0.059) (0.137) 
Return on Assets -0.047** 0.002 -0.033* -0.021 
(0.023) (0.057) (0.017) (0.045) 
OROA --Cash Flow -0.043** 0.016 -0.031** -0.024 
(0.021) (0.049) (0.014) (0.037) 
Return on Equity -0.478 -0.917 -0.421 -0.929 
(0.324) (0.751) (0.334) (0.778) 
Leverage/ Assets -0.075*** -0.089 0.004 0.019 
(0.026) (0.062) (0.006) (0.021) 
Overheads (SGA/Op. Exp.)  -0.078** -0.209** 0.000 0.003 
(0.036) (0.091) (0.004) (0.009) 
Earnings Per Share -1.302* -1.795 -0.376 -3.362 
(0.766) (2.135) (0.696) (2.396) 
Sales -22,864.203* 42,287.107 145.589 9,261.578 
(12,607.828) (30,612.852) (1,573.873) (6,311.584) 
Number Employees (Thousands) -84.706* -61.275 2.326 5.703 
(44.568) (92.892) (2.771) (5.134) 
C.      
Ceo Pay (Thousands) -4,768.8*** 4,195.7 -2,120.6 302.1 
 (1,767.3) (4,094.9) (2,283.9) (5,326.8) 
Ceo Stock Awards FV (Thousands)  -1,083.9 1,359.6 595.3 1,885.0 
(840.6) (2,480.6) (869.7) (2,222.6) 
Ceo Option Awards FV 
(Thousands) 
-2,027.8** 1,234.7 -754.9 -4,437.7* 
(1,024.3) (1,426.1) (941.6) (2,465.0) 
D.      
Number Proposals -0.370 0.686 n.a. n.a. 
(0.233) (0.894)   
Dummy Proposal Compensation -0.130 0.100 n.a. n.a. 
(0.088) (0.279)   
Polynomial in the vote share no yes no yes 
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In Table A2 we examine whether there are any pre-existing differences at the 
majority threshold between firms that pass a Say-on-Pay proposal and firms that 
don't. Columns 1 and 3 compare the characteristics of the whole population of 
firms, while columns 2 and 4 report only the effect at the discontinuity by 
including polynomials of order three on either side of the threshold. Columns 1 
and 2 refer to the variables in levels and 3 and 4 in growth rates.  
Column 1 shows that, on average, firms that pass the proposal have different 
characteristics from those where the proposal fails. For instance, firms where the 
proposal is passed have on average lower prior return on assets than those where 
it fails. These are the kind of selection problems that would make the estimates of 
a standard OLS regression biased. In contrast, when we control for a polynomial 
in the vote share and estimate the effect at the discontinuity (in column 2 and 4), 
we find that these average differences across firms on each side of the threshold 
disappear. We do find some differences in the level of overheads and the growth 
rates of option grants although given the number of coefficients that we check it 
is expected that some of them would seem statistically different even if both 
samples are drawn from the same distribution.  
In general, we do not find any systematic differences between firms on each side 
of the majority threshold. 
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TABLE A3 
Abnormal Returns Controlling for Other Proposals 
Abnormal returns are computed using two benchmarks: a market model (in 
Columns 1 and 2) and a four factor model (Fama French and momentum factors; 
Carhart,1997) (in Columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 include as controls the 
vote outcome of other proposals in the same meeting, third order vote 
polynomials to each side of the discontinuity different for SoP votes and other 
votes and year dummies. Columns 2 and 4 include a dynamic specification and 
firm fixed effects, similar to Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe (2012). The sample 
includes all votes from 2006 until June 2010. We drop observations outside the 
top (bottom) 1% of abnormal returns of the full sample. All columns control for 
year fixed effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm 
level.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and 
*** respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Market Model 
Fama French & 
Momentum 
Say on Pay Proposals         
Day of the vote, t  0.021** 0.027*** 0.014* 0.018* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
One day later, t+1  0.010  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Days t+2 to t+9  -0.018  -0.013 
   (0.024)   (0.021) 
Other Proposals      
Day of the vote, t  0.006** 0.008** 0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
One day later, t+1  0.004  0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Days t+2 to t+9  0.020  0.016 
   (0.013)   (0.011) 
      
Observations 1,024 5,120 1,024 5,120 
R-squared 0.044 0.025 0.034 0.012 
 
 
The specification in columns (1) and (3) builds on the main specification in this 
paper (equation (2)) to control for the average effect of all other governance 
proposals voted in the annual meeting by adding a second RD structure to the 
specification that is identical in structure to the one used for Say-on-Pay proposals. 
The specification uses the universe of governance-related shareholder proposals in 
firms that hold a Say-on-Pay vote. We split them into Say-on-Pay proposals and 
other proposals and estimate: 
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yf t  = D
Aft θA +PAr(vAf t, γAr) +PAl(vAf t, γAl) + DBft θB +PBr (vBf t, γBr) +PBl(vBf t, γBl) +ατ+ uf t 
 
Where the superindex A refers to Say-on-Pay proposals and B refers to other 
governance proposals. The reported coefficients are θA and θB. Whenever there is 
more than one B type proposal in a given meeting, we aggregate them (and their vote 
shares) linearly, using the same method as in Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012). 
Columns (2) and (4), additionally, allow for the possibility of dynamic effects and 
interactions between the abnormal returns at different time horizons. Following 
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) we pool the abnormal returns at different time 
horizons and estimate the following regression. 
yft+T  = D
A
ft+T θAT + PAr(vAf t, γArT) + PAl(vAf t, γAlT) + DBft+T θBT + … 
…+ PBr (vBf t, γBrT) + PBl(vBf t, γBlT) +  λfT + ατ + uftT 
 
Where the polynomials are allowed to vary at different horizons “T” and a dummy 
for the distance to the date of the vote (λfT) is added.  
The methodology of this table closely follows Cuñat, Giné and Guadalupe (2012) 
and more details can be found in its section IIB. 
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TABLE A4 
Effect of Say-on-Pay Proposals on Firm Profitability  
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on firm profitability. The specification is 
equation (2) using a polynomial in the vote share of order 3 one on each side of the threshold. The dependent 
variables are obtained from Compustat are all defined as changes. Column 1 reports changes in Tobin's Q, 
which is defined as the market value of assets (AT+mkvalt_f-CEQ) divided by the book value of assets (AT), 
and balance sheet Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITC). Column 2, 3 and 4 report the 
change in Return on Equity (NI/(CEQ+TXDITC)), in Return on Assets (NI/AT) and in the Operating Return 
on Assets (CashFlow /AT), respectivewly. Column 5 and 6 report changes in the Capex ratio (Capex/AT) 
and in Overheads (XSGA/XOPR).   All dependent variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th  percentile. 
All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. Significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Tobin Q 
Change 
ROE Change ROA Change OROA 
(CashFlow 
/AT) Change 
Capex/ Total 
Assets Change 
Overheads 
Change 
Effect from t-1 to t   
Pass 0.0517 0.0552 -0.0121 0.00891 -0.00656 -0.0121* 
(0.0876) (0.0767) (0.0226) (0.0176) (0.00669) (0.00725) 
Obs. 241 250 250 247 245 209 
R-sq. 0.259 0.065 0.083 0.060 0.173 0.053 
Effect from t to t+1 
Pass 0.134 0.107 0.0583*** 0.0511*** -0.0118** -0.0260*** 
(0.0865) (0.0768) (0.0172) (0.0157) (0.00568) (0.00946) 
Obs. 184 192 192 188 189 158 
R-sq. 0.303 0.136 0.214 0.195 0.095 0.078 
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TABLE A5 
Passing Say on Pay Proposals and Changes in the Level of Compensation 
This table presents the effect of passing a Say-on-Pay proposal on compensation measures. We estimate the specification in equation (2) using a 
polynomial in the vote share of order 3 on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are obtained from Execucomp. Column 1 reports growth in 
Total Compensation (TDC1), column 2 the change in CEO Turnover and column 3 growth in Total Compensation within CEO.  Column 4 reports growth 
in Salary and column 5 growth in Variable Compensation (Stock_awards_fv+Option_awards_fv+Bonus+ Noneq_Incent). Column 6 and 7 report growth 
in Option and Stock Portfolio, respectively. Column 8 reports growth in Stock and Option Portfolio Delta. All dependent variables are winsorized at the 
5th and 95th percentile. All columns control for year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Total 
Compensation 
Growth 
Change in 
CEO 
(Turnover) 
 Total 
Compensation 
Growth 
Salary 
Growth 
 Variable 
Compensation 
Growth 
Option 
Portfolio 
Growth 
 Stock 
Portfolio 
Growth 
 Delta Growth 
Stock & Option 
Portfolio  
   Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO Within CEO 
                  
Effect from t-1 to t        
Pass -0.155 -0.0259 -0.0212 -0.00893 -0.110 -0.328 -0.256 -0.316
(0.143) (0.111) (0.124) (0.0171) (0.129) (0.452) (0.276) (0.214) 
        
Obs 233 238 210 208 201 194 204 201 
R-sq 0.058 0.043 0.106 0.068 0.100 0.392 0.108 0.354 
Effect from t to t+1        
Pass -0.212 -0.0362 -0.173 -0.0443*** -0.197 0.599** 0.531 0.349** 
(0.194) (0.0986) (0.197) (0.0167) (0.239) (0.264) (0.414) (0.137) 
        
Obs 179 179 159 157 153 143 153 154 
R-sq 0.038 0.045 0.054 0.073 0.058 0.335 0.191 0.375 
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Figure A4 
Vote Distribution and Expected Abnormal Returns. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4 illustrates how one can recover the effect of passing a proposal on 
abnormal returns using a regression discontinuity. The figure uses 50% as the 
relevant majority threshold for all firms. The example assumes that the 
implementation of the proposal is binding; although extending the analysis to non-
binding fuzzy discontinuity design is straightforward. Our identification strategy 
only requires that there is a discrete jump in the probability of implementation at the 
majority threshold (this is the "fuzzy" regression discontinuity setting as in Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010).  
Suppose that the value of implementing a proposal is ഥܹ , that the majority 
threshold is 50% and that passing a proposal is binding (firms have to adopt it).32  
The step function W(v) represents the change in firm value as a function of the actual 
vote. Prior to the vote, the market has formed an expectation of the outcome of the 
vote and incorporated its expected impact on firm value  into stock prices, E(w| v). 
 
32 Extending the analysis to non-binding proposals is straightforward. Our identification strategy only 
requires that there is a discrete jump in the probability of implementation at the majority threshold (this is the 
"fuzzy" regression discontinuity setting as in Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  
 
50 
W(v) 
 
 
0 
100 
Z 
Excess return = W(v) – E(W|v)  
Vote share , v 
Market expectation, E(W|v) 
W  
Value 
0 
55 
 
This expectation is a smooth version of the previous step function. The abnormal 
return that we observe after the vote is the difference between the actual value of the 
proposal to the firm W(v) (which is either W or zero, depending on whether it 
passes) and its expected value before the vote E(W|v). 
One can recover the value of the proposal by fitting two flexible functions of the 
vote to each side of the discontinuity and allowing for a discrete jump at the 
discontinuity. The combination of an event study with a regression discontinuity 
design solves the pervasive problem of assessing prior expectations in an event 
study. The value Z captures (W(v)r-Er(W(v)|v))- (W(v)l-El(W(v)|v)). Where W(v)r = 
ഥܹ , W(v)l = 0, El(W|v) denotes the expected effect of the vote as the vote approaches 
50 from the left and similarly Er(W|v) when the vote approaches 50 from the right. 
As long as prior expectations are the same to each side of the discontinuity (i.e. 
E(W(v)|v)) is continuous), their effect cancels out in the RD design. 
